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Introduction    
  
We  are  pleased  to  present  the  seventh  issue  of  Études  Ricœuriennes/Ricœur  Studies  devoted  
to   the   topic   “The   Crisis   of   the   Self:   Fragility,   Vulnerability,   and   Suffering.“   This   special   issue  
draws  its  initial  inspiration  from  the  4th  International  Conference  on  Ricœur  Studies,  which  was  held  
in  Lecce   (Italy)   in  September  2012  and  was  dedicated   to   thinking  about  crisis  and  conflict  with  
Paul   Ricœur.   Yet,   this   publication   highlights   only   one   of   the   three  main   topics   covered   at   the  
conference   and   only   two   articles   here   stem   from   the   Lecce   conference.   Therefore,   we   are   not  
dealing  here  with  what  are  ordinarily  referred  to  as  conference  proceedings.  
It   is   not   an   easy   task   to   identify   a  dominant   theme  and  a   common   thread   in  Ricoeur’s  
prolific  work.  Throughout  his  intellectual  life,  the  French  philosopher  studied  very  diverse  fields:  
the   anthropological   philosophy   and   the   analysis   of   the   problem   of   evil   at   the   time   of   his  
Philosophy   of   the   Will;   the   reflection   on   the   unconscious   in   Freud   and   Philosophy:   An   Essay   on  
Interpretation;   the  problem  of   language  and   its  ontological   implications  as  examined   in  his   twin  
works,  The  Rule  of  Metaphor  and  Time  and  Narrative;  the  discovery  of  the  self  in  Oneself  as  Another;  
the  concepts  of  memory  and  recognition,  as  explored  in  his  later  works.  However,  as  conclusively  
shown  by  Domenico  Jervolino  in  Il  cogito  e  l’ermeneutica  (1993),  the  question  of  the  self  allows  us  
to  trace  a  line  of  continuity  through  work  of  such  breadth.  Ricœur’s  starting  point  is  the  critique  
of  the  Cartesian  cogito.  In  brief,  Ricoeur  envisages  a  subject  that  is  hetero-­‐‑posited,  insofar  as  it  is  
constituted  through  the  experiences  of  vulnerability,  fragility  and  suffering.  In  this  respect,  it  can  
be  that  the  "ʺcrisis  of  the  self"ʺ  represents  one  of  the  common  threads  of  his  thought.    
Ricœur  himself  states,   in   introducing  Jervolino’s  book,  that  “I  am  grateful  to  the  author  
for  perceiving   the   continuity  of   the   critique  of   the  Cogito,   its   claim   to   immediate   certainty  and  
self-­‐‑transparency,  ever  since  the  time  I  substituted  ‘I  want  to’  for  ‘I  think’  […].”  At  that  time,  in  
fact,   instead   of   reducing   the   subjectivity   to   pure   reason   -­‐‑   but   without   sacrificing   its   rational  
component   -­‐‑   Ricoeur   talks   about   a   full   cogito,   where   body   and   soul   are   inseparably   united.  
Ricoeur   overrules   the   conventional   distinction   between   soul   and   body   with   that   between  
voluntary  and  involuntary:  “there  is  no  phenomenology  of  the  pure  involuntary,  but  only  of  the  
reciprocity  of  the  voluntary  and  the  involuntary;  I  understand  the  involuntary  as  the  other  pole  
of  my  life,  as  affecting  my  will.”    
Ricoeur’s  subsequent  reflections  may  be  viewed  as  the  deepening  of  this  reflection  on  the  
the   involuntary,   whether   relative   or   absolute.   This   is   particularly   evident   when   Ricoeur  
approaches  the  "ʺmasters  of  suspicion"ʺ,  Marx  and  Freud,  inasmuch  as  the  former  shows  the  limits  
of  the  subject   in  relation  to  the  social  forces  by  which  it   is  determined  and  the  latter  denounces  
the  primacy  of  conscience  in  relation  to  the  influence  of  the  unconscious.  The  passage  through  the  
masters  of  suspicion  as  well  as   the  questioning  of  any  immediate  self-­‐‑positing  of  consciousness  
justify   the   long   detour   through   the   mediations   of   sense   (symbols,   metaphors,   narrative,   and  
institutions).   The   reasons   behind   the   hermeneutic   turn   of   Ricoeur’s   thought   are   to   be   found  
partly   in   the   admission   of   the   subject’s   inability   to   know   itself   immediately   and   partly   in   the  
belief  that  language  is  the  bridge  between  the  self  and  being.  As  already  stated  by  Ricoeur  at  the  
end  of  Fallible  Man:  “the  symbol  gives  rise  to  the  thought  that  the  Cogito  is  within  being  and  not  
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And  yet,  in  his  introduction  to  Jervolino’s  book,  Ricoeur  points  out  the  following:  “I  am  
especially  grateful   to  him  of  having  understood  that   this  critique  was  not   the   liquidation  of   the  
question   of   the   subject   itself.“   In   other  words,   taking   into   account   vulnerability,   fragility,   and  
suffering   does   not   coincide   for   Ricœur  with   the   outright   dissolution   of   the   subject,   in   contrast  
with  some  postmodern  thinkers.    This  is  clear  when  analyzing  his  thoroughly  original  approach  
to   Marxism   and   Freudianism.   With   regard   to   the   former,   Ricoeur   rejects   Althusser’s  
interpretation   whereby   the   mature  Marx   would   escape   from   any   anthropological   perspective.  
Instead,  the  problem  for  him  remains  alienated  consciousness:  ”The  core  of  Ricoeurian  Marxism,”  
says  Johann  Michel  in  Paul  Ricœur.  Une  philosophie  de  l’agir  humain   (2006),  “is  woven  around  the  
possibility  for  individuals  to  act  in  circumstances  that  they  themselves  have  not  produced.”  With  
regard  to  Freudianism,  Michel  likewise  notes  that  Ricoeur  does  not  attempt  to  reduce  the  work  of  
psychoanalysis   to   a   deconstruction   of   the   subject:   ”Freud’s   entire   effort   is   directed   toward   a  
liberation  from  the  forces   that  prevent   the  subject   from  coinciding  with   itself.”  The  crisis  of   the  
self   finds   a   limit   in   the   (at   least)   partial   capacity   of   the   subject   to   become   aware   of   what  
determines  it.  Instead  of  representing  itself  in  terms  of  self-­‐‑position,  the  subject  constitutes  itself  
though  narration,  enabling  it  to  coexist  with  the  dissonances  of  its  experiences.  This  perspective  
presupposes  a  well-­‐‑defined  anthropological  vision:  that  of  the  homo  capax,  who  is  able  to  speak,  to  
tell  stories,  to  act,  and  to  be  responsible  for  his  or  her  actions.  In  Oneself  as  Another  the  argument  
is   structured   around   these   different   roles   of   the   ego.   They   all   form   the   connection   -­‐‑without  
confusing   them-­‐‑   between   the   issues   in   the   philosophy   of   language,   the   philosophy   of   action,  
narrative  and,  finally,  moral  philosophy.  The  self  must  be  understood  therefore  as  “the  fruit  of  an  
examined  life,”  consisting  of  activity  and  passivity,  responsible  for  its  actions  and  constitutively  
open  to  otherness.  It  is  characterized  by  commitment,  that  is,  by  the  task  of  keeping  promises  and  
of  being  responsible  for  itself.    
The  articles  published  in  this  special  issue  of  Études  Ricœuriennes/Ricœur  Studies  have  the  
merit   not   only   of   being   scrupulous   surveys   of   the   concepts   of   vulnerability,   fragility   and  
suffering   in   Ricoeur,   but   also,   and   especially,   of   being   reflections   stemming   from   Ricœur’s  
perspective  on  the  limits  of  the  human  power  to  act.  
The  issue  opens  with  the  contribution  from  Cyndie  Sautereau,  “Subjectivité  et  vulnérabilité  
chez  Ricœur  et  Levinas”,  which  in  the  first  part  deftly  identifies  the  three  levels  of  vulnerability  in  
the   thought   of   the   French   philosopher:   the   reflective   level,   the   level   of   capabilities,   and   the  
ontological   level.   This   essay   then   compares   Ricœur’s   notion   of   vulnerability   with   that   more  
radical  notion,  in  the  author’s  opinion,  of  Levinas.  Whereas  Levinas  is  especially  concerned  with  
the  vulnerability  of  autrui,  for  Ricœur  the  issue  is  primarily  related  to  the  self.    
The  second  article,  “Les  limites  du  récit”,  by  Jérôme  Porée,  effectively  demonstrates  that  
Ricœur  recognized  the  limitations  of  narrative  and  of  the  narrative  identity  that  is  based  on  it,  in  
contrast  with  certain  dogmatisms  about  narration.  In  particular,  the  author  is  interested  in  what  
he   calls   the   limits   of   the   story   “towards   the   bottom,”   which   are   “those   that   have   a   role   in   the  
constitution  of  time  and  of  personal  identity.”  These  limits  reach  their  paroxysm  in  suffering,  where  
the  narrative  genre  is  exceeded:  the  power  of  language  is  limited  by  its  own  radical  experience  of  
the  unspeakable.  
In   “Mémoires   et   conflits.   Conflit   des   mémoires,   collision   des   durées”,   Jean-­‐‑Louis  
Vieillard-­‐‑Baron  not  only  compares  Bergson  and  Ricœur  on   the   issues  of  duration  and  memory,  
but  also  identifies  three  levels  of  analysis:  metaphysical  foundations,  the  aesthetic  dimension,  as  
well   as   forgetting   and   forgiving   as   forms  of   collision   of  different  durations.   In   this   regard,   the  
author   shows   the  numerous   ‘family   resemblances’   between   the   conceptions   of   time   in   the   two  
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thinkers,   especially   concerning   the   abandonment   of   the   a   priori   of   the   time   (a   true   patricide   of  
Kant),  the  predilection  for  durations  (plural)  over  duration  (singular),  and  the  idea  of  degrees  of  
the   past.   An   essential   contribution   of   Vieillard-­‐‑Baron   is   his   critique   of   the   Ricoeurian  
interpretation   of   the   problem   of   time   in  Augustine.      According   to   the   author,   any   specifically  
phenomenological   perspective   in   which   the   soul   is   self-­‐‑sufficient,   as   is   the   case   with   Ricoeur,  
neglects   the   moral   and   religious   nature   of   the   problem   of   time   in   Augustine,   conceived   as  
distentio  animi.  
The  originality  of  Ernst  Wolff’s  article,  “Competences  de  l’homme  capable  à  la  lumière  de  
l’incapacité”,   is   in   its   thesis   that   Ricœur'ʹs   hermeneutics   of   the   capable   man   requires   a  
development  of   its  technical  dimension,  that   is,  a  reflection  on  the  skills  and  the  tools  of      the  “I  
can.”   Thus,   the   author   investigates   the   correlation   between   ability   and   inability   in   humans,  
leading   to   the   claim   that:   ‘dire   que   l’incapacité   et   la   capacité   […]   sont   constitutives   l’une   de   l’autre  
signifie   que   l’incapacité,   malgré   son   caractère   “négatif”,   contribue   à   rendre   l’agent   capable   de   faire   des  
choses   […].’   If  human  nature   is  made  up  not  only  of  capacities  but  also  of   incapacities,   then  the  
technical  nature  of  the  human,  primary  and  secondary,  should  be  at  the  center  of  anthropological  
philosophy.  While,  from  an  individual  point  of  view,  technique  tends  to  compensate  for  certain  
failures,  from  a  collective  perspective  it  risks  to  compromise  what  is  best  for  agents.  This  is  what  
Wolff  refers  to  as  the  technical  paradox  at  the  conclusion  of  his  essay.  
The  article  by  Roger  Savage,  “Fragile  Identities  and  Capable  Selves”,  focuses  on  what  one  
might   call   the   “vulnerability   of   vulnerability,”   that   is,   a   form   of   vulnerability   which   affects  
individuals   and   social   groups   who   are   in   disadvantaged   positions   compared   to   others.   The  
perversion  of  this  kind  of  vulnerability  is   its  two-­‐‑fold  effectiveness,  so  to  speak.  To  an  objective  
uncertainty,   it   adds   a   "ʺsubjective"ʺ   phenomenon   of   internalization   through  which  marginalized  
individuals  and  groups  repeat  the  contemptuous  image  conveyed  by  dominant  individuals  and  
groups.   Ricoeur'ʹs   reflections   on   the   inability   to   tell   one’s   own   story   or   on   the   lack   of   self-­‐‑
recognition   as   a   form   of   violence   and   a   source   of   conflict   correspond   with   those   of   Martha  
Nussbaum,  when   she   reflects   on   the   inability   of   some   individuals,   as   is   the   case   of   numerous  
women  in  a  developing  countries  like  India,  to  understand  themselves  as  "ʺcapable  of  ..."ʺ.  Though  
not   proposing   definitive   solutions   to   this   problem,   Savage   finds   a   plausible   initial   response   in  
Ricoeur’s  consideration  of  hope  and  states  of  peace.  
Finally,  we  would  like  to  thank  all  the  colleagues  and  friends  -­‐‑too  many  to  be  mentioned  
individually-­‐‑  who,   in   various  ways,   contributed   to   the   success   of   the   2012   conference   in  Lecce  
and   to   the   publication   of   this   issue   of   Études   Ricœuriennes/Ricœur   Studies.   We   wish   to  
acknowledge  the  University  of  Salento,  the  University  of  Verona  and  the  University  of  Rome  "ʺLa  
Sapienza"ʺ   for   having   made   the   symposium   in   Lecce   possible.   Very   special   thanks   to   Johann  
Michel,  Eileen  Brennan,  and  Scott  Davidson,  who  invited  us  to  be  guest  editors  for  this  issue.  
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